A History of Online Gatekeeping by Zittrain, Jonathan
 
A History of Online Gatekeeping
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology 253 (2006).
Published Version http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2006/A_History_of_Onli
ne_Gatekeeping
Accessed February 18, 2015 9:53:47 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4455491
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAHarvard Journal of Law & Technology 
Volume 19, Number 2 Spring 2006 
 
A HISTORY OF ONLINE GATEKEEPING 
 
Jonathan Zittrain* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................253 
II. TWO KINDS OF GATEKEEPERS.....................................................254 
III. EARLY APPLICATIONS OF GATEKEEPING ONLINE: 
SUPPLEMENTS TO EXISTING PRIVATE MONITORING AND 
ENFORCEMENT REGIMES..............................................................257 
IV. LIMITED GATEKEEPING CONTINUES AS THE INTERNET 
MATURES: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, ISPS, AND OSPS............263 
V. LIMITED GATEKEEPING IS TESTED AS THE INTERNET 
DEVELOPS FURTHER: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, PEER-
TO-PEER SERVICES, AND RENEWED CONSIDERATION OF 
DUTIES TO PREEMPT OR POLICE ...................................................271 
VI. GATEKEEPING ON THE GRID: GROKSTER AS 
FORBEARANCE..............................................................................286 
VII. THE END OF REGULATORY FORBEARANCE?: FROM 
KRAAKMAN’S GATEKEEPERS TO LESSIG’S GATEKEEPERS...........294 
VIII. CONCLUSION............................................................................298 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The brief but intense history of American judicial and legislative 
confrontation with problems caused by the online world has demon-
strated a certain wisdom: a reluctance to intervene in ways that dra-
matically alter online architectures; a solicitude for the collateral 
damage that interventions might wreak upon innocent activity; and, in 
the balance, a refusal to allow unambiguously damaging activities to 
remain unchecked if there is a way to curtail them.  
The ability to regulate lightly while still curtailing the worst 
online harms that might arise has sprung from the presence of gate-
keepers. These are intermediaries of various kinds — generally those 
who carry, host, or index others’ content — whose natural business 
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models and corresponding technology architectures have permitted 
regulators to conscript them to eliminate access to objectionable mate-
rial or to identify wrongdoers in many instances. The bulk of this Ar-
ticle puts together the pieces of that history most relevant to an 
understanding of the law’s historical forbearance, describing a trajec-
tory of gatekeeping beginning with defamation and continuing to 
copyright infringement, including shifts in technology toward peer-to-
peer networks, that has so far failed to provoke a significant regula-
tory intrusion. I argue that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Grokster deci-
sion1 upholds this tradition of light-touch regulation that has allowed 
the Internet to thrive. The decision thus is not a landmark so much as 
a milestone, ratifying a continuing détente between those who build 
on the Internet and those in a position to regulate the builders. 
Grokster may have achieved such a fit with its ancestors by 
avoiding a set of now-pressing issues about gatekeepers. This avoid-
ance is revealed by looking at Grokster’s outcome: a loss for Grokster 
Ltd. that has no practical impact on the distribution and use of the sort 
of PC software that got Grokster Ltd., in trouble. The most recent 
peer-to-peer technologies eliminate a layer of intermediation from the 
networks they create; there are often no longer central websites or 
services that can be blamed, and then shut down or modified, to 
dampen the objectionable activities that they enable. Even decentral-
ized Internet service providers may prove unable to intercede much as 
new overlay networks cloak users’ network identities in addition to 
their personal ones.  
The loss of these natural points of control will cause those with 
challenged interests to foreground a new and less palatable set of in-
termediaries: software authors. These authors may be asked to write 
their software in such a way that it can be recalled or modified after it 
has been obtained by a user and then put to an undesirable purpose. 
They may even be asked to program their software to disable the in-
stalled software of others. Control over software — and the ability of 
PC users to run it — rather than control over the network, will be a 
future battleground for Internet regulation, a battleground primed by 
an independently-motivated movement by consumers away from 
open, generative PCs and toward more highly regulable endpoint plat-
forms. 
II. TWO KINDS OF GATEKEEPERS 
Regulators faced with difficulties in getting behavior to accord 
with law might elect instead to change the law to accord with the be-
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havior, especially for “parking ticket”-style wrongs that are closer to 
malum prohibitum than malum in se.2 One might put the flagstones on 
a grassy quadrangle precisely where people tend to walk, rather than 
trying to convince people to use paths that do not track where they 
would like to go, to mitigate the damage to the turf. But when the 
wrongs are more serious (or at least the lawmakers more determined) 
pointing out enforcement difficulties simply asks regulators to be 
more insistent and creative in influencing behavior. 
Efforts such as the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act3 lie in the 
camp for greater online regulation in the face of new challenges. Be-
fore the advent of modems and networks, major physical-world in-
fringers typically needed a business model because mass-scale 
copyright infringements required substantial investment in copying 
and distribution infrastructure. With the advent of the Net, large-scale 
infringements became possible through the sum of minor favors 
among friends and strangers.4 The NET Act newly permitted the 
criminal prosecution of individuals who willfully made software or 
other copyrighted works available over networks without permission, 
regardless of whether they sought to profit from the infringement.5 
However, without a correspondingly heightened investment in, or at 
least prioritization of,6 law enforcement and prosecutorial funding, 
insistence alone was not enough to return the level of infringing activ-
ity to what it had been prior to the advent of the networks themselves. 
To the extent that the Internet empowered individuals — enabling 
them to produce substantial harm at a distance without being readily 
identified, much less punished — direct forms of behavioral regula-
tion like the NET Act became less effective and therefore less appeal-
ing. Increased barriers to direct enforcement against individuals have 
been addressed primarily in two alternative ways: first, through efforts 
to enlist intermediaries to assist in regulating individuals (“traditional 
gatekeepers”); and second, through efforts to change the technology 
itself to facilitate direct identification and regulation of individuals 
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(“technological gatekeepers”). Each is grounded in the recognition 
that direct regulation of wrongdoing parties is not easy. 
The first effort — developing strategies to use human or institu-
tional intermediaries — traces its basis as far back as the emergence 
of tort doctrines of vicarious liability.7 Reinier Kraakman catalogued 
the limits of direct “primary enforcement” in an influential 1986 arti-
cle,8 advancing a general framework for when to invoke gatekeeper 
liability. Such liability asks intermediaries who provide some form of 
support to wrongdoing to withhold it, and penalizes them if they do 
not.9 Kraakman advanced four criteria for evaluating the propriety of 
compelled gatekeeping: “(1) serious misconduct that practicable pen-
alties cannot deter; (2) missing or inadequate private gatekeeping in-
centives; (3) gatekeepers who can and will prevent misconduct 
reliably, regardless of the preferences and market alternatives of 
wrongdoers; and (4) gatekeepers whom legal rules can induce to de-
tect misconduct at reasonable cost.”10 He also factored in the costs of 
gatekeeping to innocent third parties — the ways in which an under-
taking of gatekeeping duties could create friction in relationships that 
gatekeepers have with others.11 While Kraakman’s own work was 
directed at financial and other white-collar wrongdoing that might be 
curtailed through the gatekeeping functions of lawyers and account-
ants, many cyberlaw disputes are amenable to exactly this sort of 
framework. The project of creative regulators has often been to see if 
gatekeeping can successfully be applied to achieve a regulatory end 
on the Internet. 
A second effort to indirectly regulate individual behavior  — 
changing the technology itself — crystallized as a theory roughly ten 
years after Kraakman’s article, as legal systems experienced the first 
wave of problems arising from the use of the Net. Lawrence Lessig 
specifically addressed regulability issues in cyberspace, emphasizing 
that code too could be law.12 Not only did a technology’s very func-
tionality define the range of behaviors in which people could engage 
(including the range of regulatory options reasonably available to a 
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Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 & n.1 (1986). 
8. Id. at 54–55. 
9. Id. at 53–54. 
10. Id. at 61. 
11. Id. at 75–78.  
12. See Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Fu-
ture of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 761–62 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig, Limits in 
Open Code]. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS]. While Lessig made famous the idea 
that “code is law,” credit for the original conception goes to Joel Reidenberg. See Lessig, 
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sovereign) but technologies built by people could also be changed by 
people. Thus, to speak of “natural unregulability” was to mistake an 
eminently revisable instrumentality for a force of nature.13 If regula-
tors could induce certain alterations in the nature of Internet technolo-
gies in a way that others could not undo or widely circumvent, then 
many of the regulatory puzzles occasioned by the Internet would 
evaporate. Lessig went on to worry greatly about such changes, fear-
ing that blunderbuss technology regulation by overeager regulators 
would unduly disrupt legitimate uses of such regulation and intrude 
upon the creative freedom of technology makers.14 
These themes — looking to control individual behavior by alter-
ing the incentives of intermediaries and by changing the operation of 
technology — can be found in almost every doctrinal area implicated 
by cyberlaw. What is not often understood is how limited the use of 
these tools has been so far despite their potential. To understand why 
is to understand whether such forbearance will continue, and if not, 
what to expect next and how to normatively assess and deal with it. 
III. EARLY APPLICATIONS OF GATEKEEPING ONLINE: 
SUPPLEMENTS TO EXISTING PRIVATE MONITORING AND 
ENFORCEMENT REGIMES 
Evolving policies toward cyber-defamation and children’s access 
to online pornography in the United States provide useful, intertwined 
examples of regulatory forbearance early in cyberlaw’s intellectual 
history, showing interventions only in places where regulators saw 
intermediaries already filtering. 
As soon as significant numbers of consumers were online — at 
first through proprietary information services — they enjoyed a sig-
nificant amount of power and freedom to post information to the pub-
lic at large, or at least to other subscribers of their respective 
proprietary networks. These technologies were highly generative15 
regarding the transmission, use, and reuse of content, if not code: 
people could interact with each other in novel ways, inventing new 
forms of conversation at a distance and among groups through pre-
developed applications such as text-based chat, public message 
boards, and electronic file and document libraries. This generativity 
also permitted undesirable uses, such as the dissemination of defama-
tion and the transmission of pornography to children. Such behavior 
                                                                                                                  
13. LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supra note 12, at 24–25 (describing the fallacy of 
“is-ism”). 
14. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 236–39 (2001). 
15. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 
(2006). 258   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 19 
 
initiated by hard-to-find and likely judgment-proof individuals 
quickly gave rise to questions of third-party liability. 
Two common law cases stand out: 1991’s Cubby, Inc. v. Compu-
Serve, Inc.16 and 1995’s Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co.17 In each case, a proprietary “online service provider” (“OSP”)18 
facilitated the posting of actionable speech by its subscribers. In the 
CompuServe  incident, an allegedly defamatory newsletter was up-
loaded to a CompuServe data library;19 in Prodigy, a message was 
placed on a “Money Talk” bulletin board that was said to defame an 
investment bank in the midst of underwriting a stock offering.20 The 
threshold decisions on liability turned on the application of a preexist-
ing distinction in common law defamation doctrine between booksell-
ers/distributors and newspapers/publishers.21 Although both groups 
can be found liable for the third party works they make available to 
the public, the threshold for distributor liability is much higher.22 This 
is grounded in the idea that distributors are passive conduits. They do 
not undertake to edit their offerings in any fine-grained manner and 
thus are not asked to screen such materials for defamatory state-
ments.23 Publishers, on the other hand, by undertaking to edit, are 
given more responsibility for the ultimate results.24  
The facts in CompuServe were found to lend themselves more to 
a distributor configuration, because the court credited — wrongly, as 
a factual matter — that no pre-screening of uploaded materials was 
possible within CompuServe’s forums, making the service a passive 
conduit.25 Prodigy, on the other hand, had styled itself as a family-
oriented service and had undertaken to screen out objectionable mate-
rial, even after it had already been posted.26 The Prodigy court, then, 
while indicating complete agreement with the reasoning in the 
CompuServe case, came to a different outcome on its set of facts: 
Prodigy acted as an editor, and thus undertook more responsibility for 
the contents of its electronic bulletin boards than CompuServe did for 
the contents of its electronic file libraries.27 The Prodigy court ac-
                                                                                                                  
16. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
17. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by stat-
ute, Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Communications Decency Act), Pub. L. No. 104-
104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)). 
18. OSPs store information for consumers for mass distribution to others. See infra text 
accompanying notes 67–68.  
19. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 138. 
20. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.  
21. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 139–41; Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *1–5. 
22. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 139–41; Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *3. 
23. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 139–41; Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *3. 
24. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 139; Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *3. 
25. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 140–41. 
26. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *2–3. 
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knowledged that for future liability avoidance, Prodigy might want to 
structure its operations to become more passive.28 Such a decision, it 
reasoned, would rest on an economic assessment of whether public 
demand for Prodigy’s publisher-like filtering services would result in 
enough increased revenue (compared with no filtering and thus “dis-
tributor” status) to offset insurance costs for possible liabilities should 
those filtering services fail to screen out actionable material.29 
At first glance, this distinction between publishers and distribu-
tors readily accords with Kraakman’s gatekeeping theory, since those 
who are already closely editing might be able to serve gatekeeping 
roles at little additional cost. Kraakman further distinguished different 
roles a gatekeeper could undertake, including whistleblower, bouncer, 
and chaperone;30 publishers are held to the most demanding of these 
three roles. Simplifying somewhat, whistleblowers alert authorities to 
possible malfeasance when they detect it;31 bouncers refuse to deal 
with parties that are thought to be “bad” along simple dimensions;32 
and chaperones, by dint of deep, ongoing relationships with their cli-
ents, perform more complex and nuanced monitoring of, and influ-
ence over, their clients’ behavior.33 A gatekeeping regime for 
defamation, whether that of publisher or distributor, seems to antici-
pate a chaperone relationship. For professional services such as law 
and accounting, the corresponding gatekeepers are in ongoing rela-
tionships with their clients and come to know their clients’ businesses, 
and thus are in some position to knowledgably chaperone them. Fur-
ther, it is the business of lawyers and accountants to know the appli-
cable rules and limits upon first-party behavior. Bulletin board 
operators and other online intermediaries, to fulfill the gatekeeping 
role, would likewise have to familiarize themselves with the multifac-
eted content traversing their systems and be in some position to assess 
its truth — no easy task. 
In the context of OSPs, then, publisher liability would make such 
gatekeeping obligations strict, placing the gatekeeper in the shoes of 
the direct defendant speaker and imposing potentially large costs on 
the gatekeeper to detect misconduct.34 On the other hand, distributor 
liability for defamation is also a gatekeeping regime, but it is likely a 
much weaker one because it appears to require a showing of fault be-
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fore liability can attach. This standard of negligence is typically 
couched as requiring the gatekeeper to know or have reason to know 
that the carried material is defamatory.35 That level of liability was 
generous enough to allow CompuServe to win its defense on sum-
mary judgment, even if the material it permitted to appear was in fact 
defamatory, since the court believed CompuServe had no reason to 
know of the defamatory nature of the material.36  
As a policy matter, although Kraakman’s theory offers some rea-
son why a publisher should be treated less generously than a distribu-
tor, screening for defamatory content by OSPs may not call for a 
gatekeeping regime of any kind — even if the intermediary were al-
ready undertaking to edit material, as was the case in Prodigy and as, 
indeed, was also true as a factual matter in CompuServe despite the 
court’s belief otherwise. Even under weak distributor liability, for 
example, OSPs might be asked to take down actionable material after 
a plaintiff had become aware of it and explicitly flagged its possible 
defamatory content to the service provider. Such a framework might 
cast the gatekeeping role closer to that of bouncer than of chaperone, 
since the OSP would simply be acting at the behest of the injured 
party in throwing out messages that elicited complaint, or in cutting 
off subscriptions of posters who continued to post such messages.37  
While acting as a bouncer is not as onerous to the OSP as acting 
as a chaperone under these circumstances, such a shift masks the fact 
that determining wrongdoing for defamation remains difficult, and 
that substituting the purportedly injured party for the bulletin board 
operator as the chaperone may be an undesirable solution. Those 
merely offended, but not truly defamed, would be tempted to put 
OSPs on false notice that the offending material was defamatory and 
potentially lead the bouncer to overenthusiastically perform its job.38 
By the time of the Prodigy decision, proprietary OSPs, along with 
an emerging set of commercial Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), 
had acquired some political muscle. They wanted to be able to edit 
their dynamic offerings — for example, being able to selectively de-
lete undesirable message board postings — without undertaking pub-
lisher-level responsibilities for defamation for postings they 
                                                                                                                  
35. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Prodigy, No. 31063/94, 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
36. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 139–41. 
37. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127–28 (E.D. Va. 1997), the 
defamatory poster did just that, continuing to post new messages even as America Online 
(“AOL”), under pressure from the victim, deleted the old ones. It was never clear in that 
case why AOL did not terminate the victimizing subscriber entirely; it may simply have 
elected not to, or its habit of granting free trial memberships without requiring any form of 
identity authentication (something itself revisable, of course) may have made it possible for 
the subscriber to create a new account every time an old one was barred. 
38. See Jonathan Zittrain, Policy Commentary: The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom, 10 HARV. 
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overlooked.39 At the time of the Prodigy holding, which apparently 
denied them such an arrangement (at least under New York law), the 
U.S. Congress was seized with a seemingly distinct cyberlaw issue: 
the ready availability of online pornography to children  — much 
greater than that of its physical-world counterpart.40 Limits on the 
availability of offline indecent materials to children had already been 
effected primarily through gatekeeper liability; many states had estab-
lished that such materials could be sold by storekeepers only if they 
first obtained identification verifying that a young-looking purchaser 
was over a certain age.41 In contrast, the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”) of 199642 fit into the “more insistent direct regulation” 
camp rather than the third-party gatekeeping camp. It did not require 
online intermediaries to perform such a gatekeeping function. Instead, 
the Act simply criminalized “initiat[ing]” the online provision of in-
decent materials to minors43 unless the initiator had undertaken a good 
faith effort to determine the age of the person on the other end of the 
network.44 
As a policy matter, a choice to go for direct regulation in this in-
stance could reflect a conclusion that direct penalties ought to be 
given a chance before a move to gatekeeper regulation is considered. 
Asking quasi- or entirely passive conduits like OSPs and ISPs to 
screen for indecent material would create massive friction for inno-
cent third parties,45 since it could induce OSPs hosting online chat 
rooms and message boards that thrive on third-party input to shut 
down entirely, to raise drastically the cost for their services, or to 
                                                                                                                  
39. See id. at 510–13 (noting that Congress apparently recognized a need “to provide 
some degree of immunity from state law for sysops attacked for poorly managing the dy-
namic exchange of messages written by others”). 
40. See Communications Decency Act of 1995, S. 314, 104th Cong. (1995); Protection of 
Children From Computer Pornography Act of 1995, H.R. 2104, 104th Cong. (1995); Protec-
tion of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995, S. 892, 104th Cong. (1995); 
Online Parental Control Act of 1996, H.R. 3089, 104th Cong. (1996); 141 CONG. REC. 
S8268 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Robb); 141 CONG. REC. S9017 (daily ed. 
June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
41. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-8-206 (2005). It is illegal in Montana for a com-
mercial establishment to disseminate obscene material to minors, though there is an excep-
tion for shopkeepers that: 
[H]ad reasonable cause to believe the minor was 18 years of age. 
‘Reasonable cause’ includes but is not limited to being shown a draft 
card, driver’s license, marriage license, birth certificate, educational 
identification card, governmental identification card, or other official 
or apparently official card or document purporting to establish that 
the person is 18 years of age. 
Id. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding such restrictions). 
42. Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Communications Decency Act), Pub. L. No. 104-
104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §  230 (2000)), available at 
http://www.epic.org/free_speech/CDA/cda.html. 
43. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000). 
44. Id. § 223(e)(5)(A). 
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overblock content in an attempt to avoid any possible suggestion of 
liability.46 As a political matter, OSPs and ISPs may simply have pre-
vailed upon Congress to leave them out of the CDA’s liability regime 
for the transmission of materials that could be harmful to minors. 
Even in the absence of regulatory mandates on ISPs or OSPs, it 
was understood that such entities could play a useful role in filtering 
undesirable content from children. Without requiring filtering by 
gatekeepers, the CDA expressed a desire to encourage it.47 To do so, it 
loosened the emerging state-level gatekeeper liability regime for 
defamation and other common law torts. Stating that “[n]o pro-
vider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider,” the Act preempted the law of the Prodigy case, 
apparently to encourage “‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material.”48 OSPs that aggregated content from subscribers 
were now free to edit their subscribers’ work more or less as they 
pleased, without encountering the concomitant obligation to serve as 
gatekeepers for the individuals who might use the OSPs’ services to 
transmit actionable speech.49 
The CDA ended the percolation of common law cases regarding 
the proper level of gatekeeping for online defamation because the 
CDA’s immunities were thought in early interpretive cases to be 
broad enough to preclude both publisher and distributor liability.50 
CompuServe and other online intermediaries were no longer under 
any legal pressure to serve as gatekeepers for defamation in even the 
weak, “bouncer” sense. 
Just as redress for defamation ultimately did not implicate tradi-
tional gatekeeper regimes, neither did it implicate technological gate-
keeping. Even if one credits the CompuServe court’s finding that 
                                                                                                                  
46. Kraakman calls these “tertiary” costs. See Kraakman, supra note 7, at 75–77. 
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000). The CDA began with a preamble containing paeans to the 
social benefits afforded by the vibrant, rapidly-growing competitive free market in proprie-
tary and non-proprietary information networks — networks “unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” Id. 
48. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
49. This provision survived the nullification of much of the CDA on First Amendment 
grounds by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
50. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “so 
far, every court to reach the [CDA] issue has decided that Congress intended to immunize 
both distributors and publishers”). But see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 
2003) (musing in dicta that the CDA should immunize an ISP only “as long as the informa-
tion came from someone else,” and not when the ISP created the objectionable information 
itself); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 153–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 
87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004) (noting that Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 
1997), “immunized providers and users of interactive computer services from liability not 
only as primary publishers but also as distributors,” but “declin[ing] to accept Zeran’s 
construction of the [CDA]” (emphases in original)); Additional Development, Barrett v. 
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subscribers’ uploaded files were made available to other subscribers 
immediately upon submission, CompuServe could surely have 
changed its perceived regime to the one that was actually in place: 
such submitted files were parked in a purgatorial “preview” area 
where only CompuServe employees and contractors could view them 
in order to decide whether to make them widely available.51 Prodigy 
permitted messages to be posted immediately, but that too could have 
been recoded: Prodigy could have made messages await moderator 
approval. The implication of the two decisions, mooted by the CDA’s 
immunities, was that the gatekeeper was entitled to decide how active 
or passive to be, and that this decision would in turn set the rules by 
which the gatekeeper might be found to have certain obligations. Li-
ability, whether stemming from a company’s actions as a publisher or 
a distributor, focused on a gatekeeper’s conduct within its own chosen 
technical regime, rather than alternative regimes it might be able to 
employ. Law followed code and code followed business model, rather 
than the other way around. 
IV. LIMITED GATEKEEPING CONTINUES AS THE INTERNET 
MATURES: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, ISPS, AND OSPS 
Defamation was the early 1990s’ litmus test for the proper role of 
intermediaries in preventing individual online activities that were ob-
jectionable. Infringement of others’ copyrights followed, increasingly 
consuming the attention of regulators and legal scholars. 
As a political matter, content owners were a substantially more 
organized, and arguably more demonstrably harmed, group than those 
who had been defamed or those who believed their children had been 
inappropriately exposed to indecent content.52 Harm to publishers 
from network-enabled copyright infringement was more visible and 
more capable of ready economic accounting, and the publishers’ in-
terests were predictable and ongoing in a way that was not true of 
many would-be defamation plaintiffs. The publishers were out to pre-
vent a structural sea change that would enable their works to be con-
sistently pirated, and they demanded legal redress as the deck tilted 
beneath them.53 
                                                                                                                  
51. See Robert B. Charles, The New World of On-line Libel, MANHATTAN LAWYER, Dec. 
1991, at 40.  
52. For a possible explanation of this phenomenon, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 
(1974). 
53. See Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law 
Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE  FOREST  L.  REV. 169 (1995) 
(discussing proposals for copyright reform given the potential for electronic theft on the 
Internet, and concluding that current copyright law can be adapted to the Internet age); 
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The publishers’ first move was to seek gatekeeping liability as 
well as direct liability. The latter was reflected in the aforementioned 
NET Act,54 but intermediaries seemed to hold greater promise for re-
ducing infringement. Early skirmishes with the owners of individual 
electronic bulletin board systems (“BBSs”) that enabled the illicit 
swapping of copyrighted software resulted in a mix of decisions that 
roughly tracked the underlying equities of CompuServe and Prodigy, 
notwithstanding the doctrinal stovepiping of common law defamation 
and federal statutory copyright law.55 Individual bulletin board opera-
tors who seemed aware of specific pirating activity taking place 
through their systems were vulnerable to claims of contributory in-
fringement;56 enterprises that were more remote from the activity, or 
that supported a large volume and variety of activity of which the in-
fringing material was only a part, were excused.57 The pub-
lisher/distributor distinction thus roughly mapped to the judicially 
invented requisites for the establishment of intermediary liability 
through contributory or vicarious copyright infringement. While the 
definitions themselves have been in flux among various cases, con-
tributory infringers are generally those who know about infringing 
activity and who materially assist in it, and vicarious infringers are 
thought akin to employers in a traditional respondeat superior situa-
tion — those who have the right and ability to control the activity, and 
                                                                                                                  
tronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Convention, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1258 (1995) 
(examining the benefits and drawbacks of strong international enforcement measures for 
digitally-transmitted works); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html (arguing that 
old laws are ill-equipped to govern information in the digital age, and predicting that new 
technologies, like cryptography, will be essential to the protection of intellectual property). 
54. See  Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amendments to 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319).  
55. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 666–
67 (2003).  
56. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997) (finding liable for copyright infringement a BBS that offered incentives for 
subscribers to upload copyrighted images, screened the images, and moved the images to 
where other subscribers could download them); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 
923, 931–32 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (contemplating contributory liability for BBS operators who 
provided trading areas for copyrighted video games); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. 
Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding liability where the defendant BBS operator 
charged subscribers, even though it may have been unaware of the copyright infringement). 
57. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178–
79 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the person placing unauthorized copyrighted images on a 
website, but not the website hosting service, might be held liable for direct copyright in-
fringement, and finding that contributory liability against the hosting service would depend 
upon the level and timing of its knowledge of the infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367–73 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (hold-
ing that the operator of a BBS was not directly liable for copyright infringement committed 
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who financially benefit from it.58 The more an intermediary acted as a 
mere passive conduit, the less likely it would be pressed into service 
as a gatekeeper through a finding of infringement, whether contribu-
tory or vicarious. 
By the late 1990s, proprietary services like CompuServe and 
amateur BBSs were giving way to the Internet at large, and Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”) — those who gave consumers and others 
access to the Net — came into their own as businesses with political 
clout. But consumer use of the Internet still followed the hub-and-
spoke model of the competing proprietary services: the Internet-aware 
applications that developed, like web browsing59 and File Transfer 
Protocol (“FTP”),60 continued to employ the notion of consumer PCs 
asymmetrically accessing powerful servers, whether web or file serv-
ers. Consumer PCs were not yet powerful enough to handle very 
many incoming connections, if they were to try to act as servers them-
selves, and the absence of always-on connections for such PCs made 
it sensible to have information hosted elsewhere — by OSPs, who 
increasingly were also ISPs. 
These technical and market structures were the backdrop as pub-
lishers petitioned Congress in 1997–98 for regulatory assistance in 
limiting piracy. The resulting Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998 (“DMCA”)61 contained a number of distinct provisions, with 
one set bearing directly on gatekeeper liability as a means of control-
ling copyright infringement.62 This set of so-called “safe harbor provi-
sions,” found within 17 U.S.C. § 512, reflected a political calculus in 
which publishers and ISPs, whose interests did not well align, both 
had power.63 
Parallel to the CDA’s provisions protecting information service 
providers from state suit over such things as defamation,64 § 512(a) 
exempted the most passive intermediaries  — ISPs  — from any re-
sponsibility for copyright infringement for the data they carried, so 
                                                                                                                  
58. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1019–24 (9th 
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59. See BILL STEWART, Tim Berners-Lee, Robert Cailliau and the World Wide Web, in 
LIVING INTERNET, http://livinginternet.com/w/wi_lee.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2006). 
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(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998). 
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long as they were indeed passive65 and also satisfied the largely un-
tested requirement of having a policy of terminating repeat infring-
ers.66  
Section 512(c) was directed at OSPs: those who actually stored 
information for consumers for mass distribution to others, such as 
GeoCities67 or Tripod,68 or today’s YouTube69 or MySpace.70 Section 
512(c) exempted OSPs from liability so long as they acted expedi-
tiously to remove infringing material after being notified of its pres-
ence by a copyright holder.71 So, if a consumer were to upload a 
digital copy of a copyrighted book to her GeoCities home page, the 
publisher could send a “DMCA takedown notice” to GeoCities, which 
the OSP would disregard at its peril. The OSP ultimately might not be 
found contributorily or vicariously liable, but it would have to face 
litigation without the benefit of § 512’s safe harbor.72 Section 512(c) 
made some sense: OSPs did not have to worry about actively chaper-
oning their subscribers’ activities, but if something was called to their 
attention, they could remove (or demand that their subscribers re-
move) the offending material and rest assured that they would be free 
from copyright liability. Section 512(c) represented a trend of encour-
aging “bouncer” gatekeeping of the sort that might have persisted in 
the defamation context had CompuServe’s distributor liability become 
the norm for OSPs instead of being trumped by the CDA. 
As in the defamation context, a concern existed that offended par-
ties would seek to get neutral bouncers to bounce overzealously. Sec-
tion 512(f) was designed to limit takedown notices to honest ones, 
affirming that those targeted by a takedown notice — either the OSP 
or the individual content provider — could recover damages if a no-
tice-giver knowingly misrepresented the challenged material to be 
actionable. This provision was tested when electronic voting machine 
maker Diebold, Inc., found that internal company e-mails discussing 
its machines’ vulnerabilities had been leaked to the public web.73 
Among many other places, copies were placed on a website hosted by 
                                                                                                                  
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 84–92. 
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refused to do anything about it. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n 
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Swarthmore College and managed by some Swarthmore students.74 
Diebold fired off takedown notices to OSPs hosting the documents, 
including Swarthmore, alleging that the postings infringed Diebold’s 
copyrights.75 Swarthmore compelled the students to remove the 
documents, and in response, the students sued Diebold alleging, inter 
alia, a violation of § 512(f).76 The court agreed,77 and Diebold paid 
$125,000 in damages for knowingly misrepresenting the status of the 
documents,78 which were copyrighted but precluded from a finding of 
infringement by an obvious defense of fair use.79 
Short of filing a lawsuit for damages under § 512(f) when take-
down notices were thought to go too far, § 512(g) provided an alterna-
tive remedy for those posting information online: “counter-
notifications.” When an OSP notified a content-providing subscriber 
of a copyright-related complaint that had been lodged about her mate-
rial, the subscriber could avow a good faith belief that her material 
was not indeed infringing — or more precisely, that it had been tar-
geted as a result of “mistake or misidentification of the material to be 
removed or disabled.”80 The actual text of § 512(g) seemed oddly nar-
row, but if one construed “mistake” to include the idea of targeting 
noninfringing material in order to take it down, then §§ 512(g), 512(f) 
and 512(c) together evinced nuanced appreciation by Congress of the 
ways in which OSPs could make good gatekeepers — and the ways in 
which they should be left alone. 
Section 512(d) offered nearly identical conditional protections to 
those available to OSPs under § 512(c), but here they were directed to 
those running “information location tools” that merely linked users to 
infringing content elsewhere online.81 This safe harbor may have 
overreached a bit as a policy matter, unduly encouraging the blocking 
of innocent content by parties truly removed from the content’s pro-
duction or storage. Search engines, after all, are not in an explicit rela-
tionship with most of the websites they index — the way that OSPs 
are with their subscribers — which makes it harder for them to find 
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75. Id. at 1198. 
76. Id. at 1199.  
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79. See Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204. 
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and communicate with the creator of material under challenge. More-
over, given the absence of a contract, the directory service may have 
far less incentive to keep the owner of an excluded link in the loop. 
Information location tools are not at all like Kraakman’s financial 
services gatekeepers, who are in privity with the clients that they are 
opportunistically asked to monitor. OSPs, on the other hand, better fit 
Kraakman’s mold, presumably wanting to retain the subscribers 
whose material they host by allowing that material as much exposure 
as legal prudence dictates. Further, the volume of the sites that search 
engines typically index makes it manifestly labor-intensive to assess 
the credibility of takedown notices demanding removal of particular 
links from search results. Of course, as a safe harbor, § 512(d) was 
more an encouragement than a requirement; like the other provisions 
of § 512, it did not provide for liability if its conditions were not met, 
but only for the possibility of liability depending on how the judicially 
created law of contributory infringement developed. In the few U.S. 
cases on the subject, liability for mere hyperlinking has been applied 
delicately, if at all.82  
In practice, it appears that search engine services such as Google 
have routinely abided by takedown notices in recent years, likely in 
order to enjoy the safe harbor for directory services of §  512(d). 
Google tempers the removal of directory results by concomitantly 
notifying a nonprofit website clearinghouse called “Chilling Effects” 
that the removal has taken place, and placing a referral to that clear-
inghouse in Google’s results to indicate that there is missing informa-
tion.83 
The safe harbors for ISPs, OSPs, and search engines were further 
premised by § 512(i) on these entities having “adopted and reasonably 
implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in appro-
priate circumstances of subscribers . . . who are repeat infringers.”84 
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This requirement suggested a role of bouncer not simply vis-à-vis a 
particular set of information in controversy. Rather, it anticipated 
identifying bad people rather than just bad acts, and it encouraged 
ISPs and OSPs to act against those people, truly serving as bouncers 
the way bouncers at night clubs and bars do, ejecting recidivist trou-
blemakers. Must subscribers banned under such circumstances be 
banned for life in order to be true to the provision? Does “repeat in-
fringer” mean a truly adjudged one — i.e., a court has so determined 
for a given defendant — or is the ISP to make the judgment of in-
fringement, at least in obvious cases, when a third party brings alleged 
infringement to the ISP’s attention? Is the threshold of repeat in-
fringement met if a subscriber maintaining a home page has succes-
sive complaints lodged against her on Monday and then again on 
Wednesday? No authoritative answers to these questions have been 
generated. The House and Senate reports concerning §  512(i) are 
identical studies in ambiguity: 
[T]he Committee does not intend this provision 
to . . . suggest[] that a provider must investigate pos-
sible infringements, monitor its service, or make dif-
ficult judgments as to whether conduct is or is not 
infringing. However, those who repeatedly or fla-
grantly abuse their access to the Internet through dis-
respect for the intellectual property rights of others 
should know that there is a realistic threat of losing 
that access.85 
In practice, it appears that those accused of persistent copyright 
infringement through their ISPs do not have their accounts terminated, 
even though the ISPs aspire to conform to the safe harbor’s require-
ments. The publishers largely have not forced the issue of demanding 
such terminations through claims that the safe harbor has been for-
feited when threatening a lawsuit for contributory or vicarious copy-
right infringement. The only notable case has been Ellison v. 
Robertson, in which a well-known science fiction author objected to 
AOL’s apparent retransmission of pirated copies of his work through 
“Usenet,” a chaotic, decentralized newsgroup system that forwarded 
messages from individuals around the world from one subscribing 
host to another.86 Like most ISPs, AOL was a subscribing host to 
many Usenet groups; it made the groups’ constantly-updated content 
available to its subscribers, who were then able to access copies of 
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Ellison’s work, among many other things.87 AOL invoked the § 512 
safe harbor, and claimed it met the requirements of § 512(i) for im-
plementing a policy to terminate repeat infringers, despite apparently 
never having terminated a single subscriber for such infringements.88 
The district court agreed.89 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that 
AOL’s fidelity to § 512(i) was a jury question, but on the narrow basis 
that AOL had changed its e-mail address for receiving infringement 
notifications without providing sufficient notice to aggrieved authors 
like Ellison.90 AOL and Ellison settled on remand before trial.91 
OSPs like GeoCities, which are less passive than ISPs, might also 
terminate free home page accounts for any number of reasons, includ-
ing outsiders’ claims of copyright infringement, but little prevents a 
subscriber so terminated from simply establishing a new free account 
with the same OSP. Thus, while the “repeat infringer” provision of 
§ 512(i) could in theory drastically increase the degree of intervention 
asked of intermediaries, especially of passive ISPs who must satisfy 
the provision to enjoy their safe harbor of § 512(a), it has not to date 
resulted in significant bouncer-like activities by either ISPs or OSPs.92  
OSPs, ISPs, and search engines dominated the technological 
landscape of 1996–97, and the DMCA and CDA were designed to 
encourage these companies to act only in ways that would not drasti-
cally alter their business models or technological architectures. Ag-
grieved parties might allege and bring about the takedown of 
individual instances of flagrant copyright infringement, or even abuse 
the system to cause the removal of perfectly legal material, but deter-
mined individuals could repost such material elsewhere. In the mean-
time, most Internet authors would not encounter gatekeeping by the 
intermediaries through which their information flowed.  
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V. LIMITED GATEKEEPING IS TESTED AS THE INTERNET 
DEVELOPS FURTHER: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, PEER-TO-
PEER SERVICES, AND RENEWED CONSIDERATION OF DUTIES 
TO PREEMPT OR POLICE 
Uses of the Internet soon evolved beyond the simple world of 
ISPs (passive conduits for others’ material) and OSPs (hosts of others’ 
material) contemplated in 1998’s § 512 safe harbors. These develop-
ments have led to a new and more difficult set of puzzles about the 
proper use of both institutional and technological gatekeeping to cabin 
individuals’ activities.  
First, PC hardware horsepower grew. Hard disk storage capacities 
continued to double every eighteen months or so,93 and raw processor 
speeds remained remarkably true to Moore’s law,94 named after the 
Intel engineer who predicted exponential growth.95 
Second, Internet bandwidth grew,96 including Net bandwidth 
available over the “last mile”97 to many consumers.98 From 1998 on-
wards, increasing numbers of people obtained broadband or migrated 
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2006) (observing that “[a]s of August, 2004, roughly 40% of Internet subscribing house-
holds use broadband connections, and most pundits have noted that this trend will only 
increase as demand grows for more bandwidth-intensive content, especially music and 
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to it from dial-up access,99 making not only for faster connections but 
also for always-on connections, since, unlike the modem, the high 
speed connection did not occupy a household’s telephone line.100 
In 1998, PCs out of the box could recognize and play audio com-
pact discs (“CDs”), but offered no option to copy them to a PC hard 
drive. Much as independent programmers developed the first software 
allowing PCs to easily connect to the Net,101 outside developers wrote 
simple code enabling “digital audio extraction” of standard music 
CDs onto PCs.102 The resulting files could be quite large, especially 
for hard drive capacities of the era, but clever algorithms for digital 
music compression emerged, including the independently patented 
“MP3” standard.103 It was now feasible to store high-quality copies of 
one’s CDs on a PC.104 
These MP3 files could be distributed via e-mail or even posted on 
the web. Should they be posted on a home page hosted in the typical 
subscriber/OSP configuration, they would be vulnerable to OSP take-
down, since the OSP would want to retain the § 512(c) safe harbor, 
just as the 1998 DMCA intended. Thus aided by OSP gatekeepers, 
recording industry publishers engaged in a sufficiently rapid cat-and-
mouse game with those posting MP3 files online, and battled at least 
to a stalemate, if not better.105 At that time, there were no easy, con-
tinuous, reliable sources for pirated music on the Net at large. 
                                                                                                                  
99. See id.; see also JOHN B. HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN 
LIFE  PROJECT,  THE  BROADBAND  DIFFERENCE 4–5 (June 23, 2002), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband_Report.pdf. 
100. See R OUZBEH  YASSINI ET AL.,  PLANET  BROADBAND 91–93 (2003), available at 
http://www.informit.com/articles/article.asp?p=101402&seqNum=2 (describing the “an-
thropology” of always-on Internet connections in daily life). 
101. See Trumpet Software International, History, http://www.trumpet.com.au/ 
history.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2006); Zittrain, supra note 15, at 1992. 
102. See B RUCE  FRIES,  THE  MP3 AND INTERNET  AUDIO  HANDBOOK (2000) 169–80, 
available at http://www.teamcombooks.com/mp3handbook/15.htm (“Digital audio extrac-
tion (DAE), commonly referred to as ripping, is the process of copying audio data directly 
from a CD. Because it bypasses the sound card, ripping normally results in a perfect copy 
with no introduction of noise or loss of fidelity.”). For an example of an open source digital 
audio extraction software application, see Ripoff: Python Tools for CD Ripping, 
http://ripoff.sourceforge.net/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2006).  
103. See also FRIES, supra note 102, at 1, available at http://www.teamcombooks.com/ 
mp3handbook/Intro.htm (“MP3 (technically, MPEG Audio Layer-III) is a standard format 
for compressing digital audio. MP3 squeezes audio files to about one tenth of their original 
size, while maintaining close to CD quality.”). 
104. See id. 
105. JOHN  ALDERMAN,  SONIC  BOOM:  NAPSTER,  MP3, AND THE NEW  PIONEERS OF 
MUSIC 30 (2001); Janelle Brown, Heat Turned Up on Digital Music Pirates, WIRED NEWS, 
Feb. 12, 1998, http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,10234,00.html; see also F RIES, 
supra note 102, at 43–56, available at http://www.teamcombooks.com/mp3handbook/5.htm 
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Subsequent innovations clouded such gatekeeping operations. In 
May 1999, teenager Shawn Fanning founded Napster.106 Napster was 
three things, together representing the emerging PC/Internet grid. 
First, Napster was a piece of software that one could download to a 
PC running recent versions of the Windows operating system.107 Sec-
ond, it was a website, which one could visit in order to get the soft-
ware, and a corresponding Internet server that one’s PC could access 
once the software was running.108 And third, more inchoately, it was a 
“network” — a set of virtual connections among people running the 
Napster application on their networked PCs, brokered by the Napster 
server through the Internet.109 
Napster users could denote areas of their PC hard drives contain-
ing MP3 files that they wished to make available to other Napster us-
ers.110 When running the software, each PC would check in to the 
central Napster server over the Internet and alert it to the contents of 
these shared directories.111 Users wanting to find MP3 files held by 
others could then ask the central Napster server whether particular 
files, identified by name or parts of a name, could be found on any-
one’s drive.112 When the Napster server found a match between 
someone desiring a file and someone offering that file, the Napster 
software on the respective machines would then orchestrate a direct 
PC-to-PC connection so that the file could be transferred.113 The in-
creasing number of always-on consumer connections meant that PC 
owners could leave Napster running twenty-four hours a day, provid-
ing others with constant access to their files and incurring no special 
charge, since broadband access within the U.S. is typically metered at 
a flat rate regardless of the amount of data transferred.114 
                                                                                                                  
106. Wikipedia,  Napster, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster (as of Mar. 24, 2006, 
18:26 GMT); see also S TUART  BIEGEL,  BEYOND  OUR  CONTROL?:  CONFRONTING THE 
LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 286–90 (2001). See generally 
JOSEPH  MENN,  ALL THE RAVE:  THE  RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN  FANNING’S  NAPSTER 
(2003). 
107. Susan Crosse et al., Napster, in P2P NETWORKS (TCD 4BA2 PROJECT 2002/03) ch. 
4 (2003), http://ntrg.cs.tcd.ie/undergrad/4ba2.02-03/p4.html (explaining the basic structure 
of Napster). 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE 
OF ENTERTAINMENT 111 (2004). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See, e.g.,  BroadbandReports.com, http://www.broadbandreports.com/dosearch? 
cheap=1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2006) (listing broadband providers by monthly charge). But 
see  Jo Twist, Goodbye to a Flat Rate for Broadband?,  BBC  NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, 
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PC data storage; file searching; file transfer  — the building 
blocks of Napster simply awaited someone like Fanning to put them 
together into a service whose whole would yield an impact greater 
than the sum of its parts. Fanning needed no gatekeeper’s permission 
to open shop at Napster.com or to write an application that could run 
on a massive percentage of existing consumer PCs. Consumers found 
no barrier to the addition of Napster software to their generative ma-
chines, nor to the use of their network connections to transmit Nap-
ster-related data. Network and PC generativity enabled modern file-
sharing to go from nonexistent to ubiquitous in a stunningly short pe-
riod of time. Napster’s popularity blossomed, and the more popular 
Napster became, the more valuable it became to consumers because 
more files were available on its network.115 
The U.S. recording industry’s trade association sued Napster, 
Inc., to try to shut down its service through an injunction and perhaps 
incapacitating damages.116 The lengthy litigation itself spawned a 
number of new technologies to fill Napster’s shoes,117 and in turn a 
new round of lawsuits designed to stymie Napster’s successors.118 The 
judicial opinions rendered in these lawsuits sought to apply doctrines 
of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement to new fact pat-
terns. With concomitant legislative activity, these opinions repre-
sented traditional regulatory efforts to prune away undesirable 
applications of network and PC generativity without requiring undue 
gatekeeping by intermediaries. Such efforts showed the judicial sys-
                                                                                                                  
115. See BIEGEL, supra note 106, at 421 n.12. Napster’s popularity grew quickly. When 
the program started in September 1999, the number of users was doubling every five to six 
weeks. Matthew Green, Note, Napster Opens Pandora’s Box: Examining How File-Sharing 
Services Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 801 
(2002). As of December 21, 2000, Napster had more than 40 million registered users. Da-
mien A. Riehl, Note, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and 
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1767 
n.30 (2001). At Napster’s height of usage in February 2001, Napster had more than 80 mil-
lion registered users. Green, supra, at 802; Matt Richtel, Upheaval at Bertelsmann May End 
Plans for Acquisition of Napster, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at C1. In January 2001, it was 
estimated that approximately 1.6 million users were connected to Napster at all times and 2 
billion songs were downloaded. Green, supra, at 802; Jefferson Graham, Napster Moving 
Toward Monthly Fee: Song-Swapping Service Could Set the Tone for Internet Music Sales, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1. 
116. Notice of Joint Motion & Joint Motion of Plaintiffs for Preliminary Injunction, In re 
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-99-5183 
MHP), 2000 WL 34016493. 
117. See Leander Kahney, Still Plenty of Music Out There, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 13, 2001, 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,41775,00.html. 
118. See, e.g., Katie Dean, P2P Whipping Boy: Know the Risks, WIRED NEWS, May 10, 
2003, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,58783,00.html; Brad King, Kazaa: A Copy-
right Conundrum, WIRED  NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, http://www.wired.com/news/print/ 
0,1294,50788,00.html; Brad King, File Trading Sites in Crosshairs, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 3, 
2001, http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,47296,00.html; Play it Again RIAA: Sue 
Morpheus, REUTERS, June 3, 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/ 
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tem struggling with questions of regulability of individual behavior, 
and of the extent to which various service providers (traditional gate-
keepers) and technology creators (technological gatekeepers) should 
be enlisted to halt — or stop enabling, depending on one’s baseline — 
undesirable user behavior. 
The district court issued a preliminary injunction against Napster, 
the core of which was upheld on appeal.119 As a doctrinal matter, the 
Ninth Circuit first determined that the unauthorized swapping of 
copyrighted files among strangers was a direct infringement — a find-
ing that perhaps lent too little weight to fair use considerations.120 
Once direct infringement was established, the court turned to the 
question of whether Napster was contributorily and vicariously re-
sponsible for aiding the infringing activities.121 The Ninth Circuit 
opinion in this respect was careful and measured. 
The court reasoned that the § 512(d) safe harbor for information 
location tools probably would not apply, but recognized that the ques-
tion would be more fully developed once the case reached trial.122 
Such a judgment is not surprising because, in the district court, Nap-
ster had only weakly claimed in the alternative to fall under 
§ 512(d).123 Instead, Napster had pinned its hopes on §  512(a),124 
wanting to be characterized as a passive conduit ISP and thereby 
avoid the notice-and-takedown predicates of § 512(d), which it appar-
ently had not met.125 Napster was not an ISP — indeed, neither plain-
                                                                                                                  
119. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).  
120. See id. at 1013–16; see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digi-
tal Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1400 
n.222 (2004) (“While the Ninth Circuit gave short shrift to Napster’s claims that its users 
were engaged in ‘space-shifting’ (downloading songs they already owned in order to play 
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121. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020–23. 
122. Id. at 1025. 
123. See A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc. (Napster DMCA), No. C 99-05183 MHP, 
2000 WL 573136, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000) (noting that “defendant maintains that, 
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able at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/Napster/DMCA_Ruling.pdf. 
124. See id. 
125. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24 
(N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This finding 
also puts an end to defendant’s persistent attempts to invoke the protection of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. section  512. In its opposition brief, Napster, Inc. 
attempts to persuade the court that subsection 512(d) provides an applicable safe harbor. 
However, this subsection expressly excludes from protection any defendant who has ‘actual 
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tiff nor defendant claimed that Napster was in the business of trans-
mitting files from one user to another — and both the district court 
and Ninth Circuit properly relied on this fact in rejecting § 512(a) as 
well.126 
In the absence of these safe harbors, Napster was now subject to 
an analysis of contributory and vicarious infringement. Recall that 
contributory infringers are those who know about infringing activity 
and who materially assist in it. This standard is met, in the easy case, 
if one has actual knowledge of infringement and then assists in it or 
fails to stop assisting. Thus, a copy shop like Kinko’s would be asked 
to serve as a gatekeeper when its employees were explicitly presented 
with copyrighted material clearly labeled “all rights reserved” and 
asked to produce copies of it, as for student course packs.127 This sce-
nario is akin to the defendant-friendly “distributor” level of liability 
that a bookstore might assume for knowingly stocking and selling 
defamatory material. OSPs were explicitly exempted from this 
CompuServe level of liability for defamation thanks to the CDA, a 
distinction from the copyright context that might be understandable if 
one thinks a gatekeeper would have more difficulty verifying a text’s 
defamatory character than its copyright status.128 
The easy case of actual knowledge can quickly give way to harder 
ones. What about copy shops that simply place photocopying ma-
chines in the lobby and allow customers to use them on a fee-for-page 
basis? Appropriately, the availability of machines that could be used 
for copyright infringement — and no doubt are, over the course of the 
day, arguably giving rise to constructive knowledge of infringe-
ment — does not alone give rise to the level of knowledge requisite 
for contributory liability.129 One could imagine asking Kinko’s to 
                                                                                                                  
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.’ § 512(d)(1)(B). Defendant has 
failed to persuade this court that subsection 512(d) shelters contributory infringers.”). 
126. See Napster DMCA, 2000 WL 573136, at *5; Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
127. See  Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Stephana I. Colbert & Oren R. Griffin, The Impact of “Fair Use” 
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128. There are nontrivial problems even in identifying copyright status. See, e.g., Chris 
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 497, 515 (2004). 
129. While copyright infringement cases have been successfully brought against copy 
centers with full-service copying functions, supra note 127, no reported cases have chal-
lenged the mere act of providing self-service copying machines. But cf. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178–79 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (leaving 
open the prospect of contributory infringement for the defendant web hosting company, 
whose subscriber placed infringing material on its servers, despite finding defendant not 
liable for direct infringement because it was “much like the owner of a public copying ma-
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monitor its customers’ self-service machine use and fitting such gate-
keeping liability within the contributory or vicarious copyright in-
fringement framework, but the law rightly stops short in such an 
instance. Such a regime would impose excessive tertiary costs upon 
innocent customers, who would be unable to gain access to self-
service photocopying because shops would be compelled to charge 
significantly more to cover monitoring costs, or would simply shut 
down the service entirely.130 Exactly where to draw the line is a matter 
for further cases, but the line-drawing in the copy shop cases exhibits 
a sensitivity toward eliminating flagrant instances of gatekeeper-aided 
individual wrongdoing while avoiding excessive burdens on gate-
keepers.131 
Similarly, the upstream makers of photocopying machines and 
similar technologies are insulated from contributory liability for the 
act of producing and distributing the technologies. The landmark Sony 
case of 1984 imported the “staple article of commerce” doctrine from 
patent law to apply to copyright law in contributory infringement 
cases where, otherwise, the manufacturer arguably would have con-
structive knowledge of the infringing uses to which its product might 
be put.132 So long as the product was “merely . . . capable of substan-
tial noninfringing uses,”133 its maker — in the absence of specifically 
marketing the product for wrongful uses134  — would not be found 
liable for infringement. Sony evinced solicitude for new technologies 
that could find legitimate use once they took hold, and a concern that 
if the contributory infringement doctrine were applied too broadly, 
copyright holders could extend their monopolization of the market in 
their works into monopolization of VCR production itself — an enti-
                                                                                                                  
1833, 1874 & n.210 (2000) (suggesting that after Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), most ISPs lack “the requisite level of knowledge” for the 
imposition of contributory liability).  
130. Compare Lemley & Reese, supra note 120, at 1349–50 (cautioning against unre-
stricted liability and noting that innovation will be stifled by going after third parties like 
investors and law firms), with Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liabil-
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131. Cf. Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technol-
ogy, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
247 (2001) (arguing that a court should be very cautious about extending copyright liability 
to makers of technologies like Napster because an injunction does not increase the possibil-
ity of meaningful bargaining or decrease transaction costs, and as such, may conflict with 
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132. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440–42 (1984). 
133. Id. at 442. 
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tained the statement: “Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be 
copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such material may be contrary to the provisions of 
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tlement not granted by copyright law, and one that indeed would be 
harmful to innovation.135 
In its application of Sony, the Ninth Circuit was laudably careful 
in distinguishing between Napster as a technology (the client software 
and the file-matching server) and Napster as an ongoing service.136 
Napster was, in essence, both building a particular kind of photocopy-
ing machine out of parts drawn from PCs and the Internet and offer-
ing a copy-shop-like service by running the server software at 
Napster.com. The opinion implies that had Napster merely built the 
Napster server and client software and then conveyed the server op-
eration to someone else, it likely would have escaped liability under 
Sony. 
It was Napster as a service that posed the greatest intellectual 
challenge of the case, and that ultimately landed Napster, Inc., in hot 
water. If the service operated analogously to a copy shop in important 
respects, the challenge would be determining whether Napster’s op-
eration were more like the copy shop lobby or the activity behind the 
shop’s counter. On the one hand, while the Napster service was par-
tially centralized, no human intervention occurred at the hub to make 
the service work.137 The pairing of people looking for MP3 files with 
those offering them was automatic.138 This characterization makes 
Napster seem like the self-service section in the copy shop lobby; as a 
matter of course, no one in authority watched or intervened in the cus-
tomers’ work once the customers were registered.139 On the other 
hand, all requests flowed through Napster’s servers, which meant that 
infringing files could be detected and potentially blocked once 
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136. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We are compelled to make a 
clear distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster’s conduct in 
relation to the operational capacity of the system.”). 
137. Napster’s server maintained a “search index” of Napster’s collective directory. The 
server compiled a list of all MP3 file names from the search index and transmitted the list to 
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139. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
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Napster, Inc. at 23, Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (Nos. 00-16401, 00-
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found.140 Indeed, the record companies themselves could and did de-
tect them with decent, if not complete, accuracy: they simply became 
Napster users and asked for file names matching the titles of songs 
whose copyrights they controlled.141 
The Ninth Circuit fashioned an application of contributory in-
fringement that addressed this situation somewhere between the lobby 
and the counter. The court said that Napster would not have to ferret 
out infringing files on its own, but affirmed the district court’s finding 
that, once notified of such files by the record companies, Napster must 
do everything feasible to block these files from its system.142 The dis-
trict court had little patience for the cat-and-mouse game that re-
sulted143 as Napster tried to modify its service, under the supervision 
of a special master, to filter out infringing files identified by the re-
cord companies, and users allegedly tried to cloak such files from de-
tection through tricks like more creative naming conventions.144 One 
could take issue with the district court’s application of this standard, 
but the overall rule showed sensitivity to the technological status quo; 
the courts did not want to tell software authors how to write their 
software. To do so, even with a generous standard of liability, would 
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ing content’” (quoting Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1027)).  
143. See id. at 1097 (“The district court was dissatisfied with Napster’s compliance de-
spite installation of a new filtering mechanism. . . . The district court ordered Napster to 
keep the file transferring service disabled until Napster satisfied the court ‘that when the 
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get zero tolerance. . . . [T]he standard is, to get it down to zero.’”). 
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make amateur software writers concerned that any tool they devel-
oped could produce a lawsuit.  
Rather, the court stuck to opportunistic traditional gatekeeping of 
the sort found in Prodigy, and endeavored to tell service providers 
how to offer those services that were closely enmeshed with copyright 
infringement. To expect otherwise would ignore both the politics of 
the situation and its equities. The Napster service enabled, in plain 
view of the world, the infringement of millions of copyrights on a 
daily basis. It appeared to have been founded for that very purpose, 
and it was promoted using screen shots listing song titles that ap-
peared to be plainly infringing.145 The initial inability of the service 
operators to find out the identity of its users or whether a specific file 
was infringing was something that could be changed, especially if the 
design decisions behind such limitations were taken precisely to avoid 
liability: a co-founder of Napster had explained “the need to remain 
ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses ‘since they are ex-
changing pirated music.’”146 To the extent that the service could be 
easily changed, the court would require it. To be sure, changing the 
way the service worked entailed changing its software, but this was 
still a different matter than changing the fundamental architecture of 
Napster. At a copy shop counter, changes to service offerings to con-
form to legal requirements might happen through new instructions to 
employees; online, the changes are facilitated through new instruc-
tions to software. These instructions could be implemented compara-
tively easily, because the software in question already operated at the 
level of individual files.147 File names (and corresponding files) were 
the units by which Napster operated, and a filter could be interposed 
that blocked one file name (or file) but not another.148 The court 
would not tell software writers how to write their software, but it 
would tell for-profit service operators how to tweak their software — 
an astute distinction in a difficult case. 
This distinction is sensible because it separates elements of analy-
sis that are otherwise easy to conflate. By the Ninth Circuit’s lights, 
the first question to ask in a contributory copyright infringement case 
is whether the instrumentality at issue is a product or a service. If it is 
a product, then the Sony rule applies, and so long as the product is 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge of 
infringing uses will not be imputed and the inquiry ends, preserving 
maximum freedom for those who write software. If the instrumental-
                                                                                                                  
145. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919. 
146. Id. at 918 (emphasis in original). 
147. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1012. 
148. See Napster III, 284 F.3d at 1095–96, 1098 (affirming the district court’s order that 
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ity is a service, then the Sony rule goes so far as to say that the service 
provider is under no general duty to monitor for infringing materials. 
However, if the service operator is told of specific infringing material, 
then the operator is under a duty to purge such material from its index 
as much as is feasible — with “feasible” no doubt being a much con-
tested debate between the publisher and the service provider.149 This 
duty to feasibly purge attaches even when the service is generally ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses, since there is now actual 
knowledge of infringement; constructive knowledge need not be im-
puted, so the Sony defense does not come into play. The Ninth Circuit 
maintained  Sony’s implicit distinctions between products and ser-
vices, between distributor and publisher liability, and between tradi-
tional and code-based gatekeeping.  
Truly passive ISPs likely would not be swept into this application 
of Sony. First, they transmit rather than index or store material, and 
thus have nothing to purge if they are later told of infringements. Sec-
ond, § 512(a) specifically exempts them from a claim of infringement, 
at least so long as they abide by §  512(i)’s curiously untested re-
quirement to terminate repeat infringers.150 Those offering more ge-
neric services that could enable infringement, such as e-mail 
providers, “file locker” companies,151 or instant messaging services152 
would also remain off the hook. As a practical matter, so long as Sony 
is thought to preclude the duty to actively seek out infringements, then 
those infringements would remain private, and publishers would be 
unable to identify them and bring them to the service provider’s atten-
tion for action. It is only when a service allows the public swapping of 
files among complete strangers that the publishers can so cheaply 
identify infringing materials and ask for intervention. It was this very 
fact that called for attention as a political matter: Napster was the 
open air drug market of copyright infringement, and as such, the ser-
vice it provided had to be stopped. 
                                                                                                                  
149. Compare, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. et al. & Leiber et al.’s Opening Brief, supra note 
144, at 5 (arguing that the requirements to provide notice of infringing files to Napster is a 
burden “akin to trying to prevent a record store from infringing copyrights by ordering the 
copyright owners first to go through all of the record store’s inventory, locate the music they 
own, and then give that information to the store before it has to remove those works . . . . 
Unlike a record store, however, not only are millions of different works available on Nap-
ster, but the identities and availability of those millions of works change literally every 
second” (emphasis in original)), with Reply Brief of Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Napster, Inc. at 3, Napster III, 284 F.3d 1091 (Nos. 01-15998, 01-16003, 01-16011, 01-
16308), 2001 WL 34095289 (“As far as Plaintiffs are concerned, no amount of policing will 
suffice — even if additional screening methods result in massive overblocking of nonin-
fringing works, and even if Napster must radically change its architecture by adopting a 
‘filter in’ scheme in which all content is preapproved before being made available.”). 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 84–92.   
151. See, e.g., YouSendIt, http://www.yousendit.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2006). 
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The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion on slightly dif-
ferent reasoning when it ruled against Aimster.153 Aimster was very 
much like Napster.154 It was marketed to individuals who wanted to 
trade music files. It comprised a website that one could visit, proprie-
tary software that one could download to one’s PC, and a central 
server accessed by that software that performed the indexing function, 
as Napster did.155 In a programming shortcut, at the moment that an 
Aimster user wanted to download a file from another user, the PC’s 
instant messaging software was invoked to perform the transfer. The 
Aimster software itself did not perform the peer-to-peer file trans-
fer.156 The website also offered “Club Aimster,” whereby users could 
pay a fee to find out what the most popular music files were.157 Of 
course, the popular files generally turned out to be music under copy-
right.158 
Like Napster, Aimster first tried to rely upon a § 512 safe harbor. 
In a brief and somewhat murky section of its opinion, the Seventh 
Circuit accepted the categorization of Aimster as worthy of the pro-
tections of one of the § 512 subsections,159 but did not find it neces-
sary to settle on a particular subsection because Aimster did not 
enforce a policy of terminating repeat infringers as required by 
§  512(i)  — indeed, it appeared to encourage copyright infringe-
ment.160  
The court’s description of the scope of contributory infringement 
was simultaneously narrower and broader than the Ninth Circuit’s, 
averaging out to roughly the same result, but with worrisome implica-
tions for IT generativity. The scope was narrower because the Seventh 
Circuit believed that Sony’s limitations on liability applied even in the 
face of “actual knowledge of specific infringing uses,”161 stating that 
the Ninth Circuit erred in holding otherwise. The court based its con-
clusion on the fact that Sony, Inc., was held not to be an infringer 
even though the Sony majority acknowledged that 25 percent of VCR 
                                                                                                                  
153. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
154. See Wikipedia, Madster, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madster (as of Feb. 27, 2006, 
00:29 GMT) (“Madster was one of the many P2P file sharing services that appeared in 
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its traffic, it used its own servers.”). 
155. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 652. The court noted, “Club Aimster’s monthly fee is the only means by which 
Aimster is financed.” Id. 
159. Id. at 655 (citing to the definition of Internet service provider at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(k)(1)(B)). 
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users were said to be using the equipment to infringe copyrights.162 
The Ninth Circuit had the better of this argument, pointing out that the 
question was not whether a creator of a technology knew of a specific 
infringement, but rather whether the creator found out at a time when 
something could be done about that specific infringement. For a con-
sumer to infringe using a VCR, she had to own one, but by that time, 
it was too late for Sony to try to stop her infringing behavior. Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit read Sony to provide a near-blanket exemption from 
liability for creators of products, so long as those products were capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses.163 Knowledge of the product’s 
infringing uses in the marketplace would not provide a basis to de-
mand that a manufacturer have preemptively designed the product to 
avoid those uses. 
In this respect, the Seventh Circuit treated creators of products 
and providers of services interchangeably. While this result may have 
seemed to be a boon to some would-be defendants — giving service 
providers more extensive protection under Sony’s rule than the Ninth 
Circuit’s reading would  — the Seventh Circuit then proceeded to 
broaden the scope of contributory infringement by eliminating “capa-
bility of substantial noninfringing uses” as the trigger for Sony protec-
tion.164 The only facts developed in the district court were that 
Aimster was used to trade copyrighted files; while it surely could have 
been used to, say, trade business documents, as the defendants argued, 
the court found it significant that there was no evidence that it had 
actually been so used.165 Once the simple thought experiment thresh-
old of “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” was read to be a 
necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for exemption from con-
tributory liability, a balancing test was added to fill out the picture: 
“[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has nonin-
fringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective 
magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory 
infringement.”166 The court then imagined possible noninfringing uses 
                                                                                                                  
162. Id. 
163. At least one commentator argues that the Aimster ruling was significantly driven by 
Aimster’s failure to produce evidence of substantial noninfringing uses, even though Sony 
suggests that the burden of proof falls to the plaintiff. See Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Aim-
ster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 21, 42 (2004) (“First, and fatally to Aimster, [Judge Posner] proposed that the 
burden to show substantial noninfringing uses falls on the defendant.”). 
164. See id. at 34; Brandon M. Francavillo, Note, Pretzel Logic: The Ninth Circuit’s Ap-
proach to Contributory Copyright Infringement Mandates that the Supreme Court Revisit 
Sony, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 855, 868–69 (2004). 
165. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653 (“[D]efendants here have provided no evidence whatsoever 
(besides the unsupported declaration of Deep) that Aimster is actually used for any of the 
stated non-infringing purposes.” (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Aimster Copyright 
Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653 (N.D. Ill. 2002))). 
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for Aimster, but denied them weight for lack of any evidence that they 
were in use.167 
The principal drawback of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning was 
that its interpretation of Sony provided less of a shield to makers of 
products as well as service providers. The court noted that the Sony 
opinion did not discuss the possibility that the VCR manufacturer 
could have preemptively engineered the recorder in a way to preclude 
some infringement,168 but that its reasoning did suggest that a test bal-
ancing the cost of such engineering against the benefit to be gained 
would be appropriate in such an instance.169 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit conflated the dis-
tinction between products and services — the underlying technology 
and the way the business operates. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit 
also blurred the distinction between publisher and distributor liability 
upon which technology companies had come to rely. The Seventh 
Circuit’s approach also exposed technology companies to a new type 
                                                                                                                  
167. Id. at 652–53. 
168. The Seventh Circuit noted:  
[A]lthough Sony could have engineered its video recorder in a way 
that would have reduced the likelihood of infringement, as by elimi-
nating the fast-forward capability, or . . . by enabling broadcasters by 
scrambling their signal to disable the Betamax from recording their 
programs (for that matter, it could have been engineered to have only 
a play, not a recording, capability), the majority did not discuss these 
possibilities. 
Id. at 648 (citations omitted). 
169. Cf. BIEGEL, supra note 106, at 313–20 (discussing code-based regulations regarding 
copyright infringement, noting that “issues of cost to content providers and convenience to 
online users had not yet been adequately addressed. But few prognosticators challenged the 
conventional wisdom that the inevitability of advances in this area will result in more wide-
spread use of these services over time.”). One commentator agrees that a balancing test 
strikes the best balance between technology and music innovators but suggests one different 
from that proposed by Judge Posner in the Aimster opinion: 
Instead of outright exoneration, distributors of such articles should 
gain only a rebuttable presumption of non-infringement. If plaintiffs 
can successfully show that current infringing uses of the product out-
weigh its non-infringing uses, defendants must show that measures to 
eliminate or reduce infringing uses would be disproportionately 
costly. In determining whether the cost is disproportionate, however, 
remedial measures that would impair non-infringing uses of the arti-
cle should not be considered. 
Tom Graves, Note, Picking Up the Pieces of Grokster: A New Approach to File Sharing, 27 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 137, 160 (2004). Another commentator argues for a supple-
ment to the Sony “staple article of commerce” test: “[S]upplying that article should give rise 
to liability for contributory infringement if either the magnitude of infringing use is suffi-
ciently large in comparison to noninfringing use, or if the evidence demonstrates that the 
primary purpose for the product is to facilitate direct infringement.” Jesse M. Feder, Is Be-
tamax Obsolete? Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Nap-
ster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 910 (2004). See also Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? 
The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 
939, 942 (2001) (advocating a “context-specific approach to the staple article of commerce 
doctrine that invokes it only when necessary to protect consumers’ access to markets sub-
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of gatekeeping liability that had not been previously recognized in the 
law: code-based gatekeeping. The Seventh Circuit chose not to re-
spect the traditional, limited gatekeeping obligations that centered on 
business practices. 
The Seventh Circuit’s test put all authors of generative technolo-
gies at risk of finding themselves on the wrong side of a court’s 
cost/benefit balancing.170 Indeed, they were asked to actively antici-
pate misuses of their products and to code to avoid them. Such gate-
keeping is nice when it works, but it imposes extraordinary costs not 
readily captured by a single cost/benefit test in a given instance.171 
Those who code for fun might simply cease to do so in order to avoid 
threats of liability under such a scheme.
172 And those who code more 
generative technologies  — either by designing, say, operating sys-
tems, or by building applications that are themselves recursively gen-
erative173  — are the most at sea as to their potential liability. The 
more adaptable a technology, the more unpredictable its uses, and 
therefore the more uncertain the creator is as to her liabilities under 
the Seventh Circuit test. If one wants to encourage broad information 
technologies amenable to adaptation by diverse audiences, it may 
come with the price that flexible technologies can give rise to bad 
uses as well as good ones. The Ninth Circuit recognized the prospect 
that seemingly bad uses could turn out to be good, as it later articu-
lated in Grokster, noting that “time and market forces often provide 
equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new technology be a 
player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal 
computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 player.”174 
The Ninth Circuit’s test imposed essentially no duty on software 
makers to preempt bad individual activities; gatekeeping duties only 
arose when, after the moment of infringement, a service provider was 
notified of the infringement and asked to act. The Seventh Circuit’s 
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tially negative effects. The principle of unintended consequences, for example, certainly 
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172. Cf. Jackson Lenford, Write Free Software, Pay $203,000 to Patent Holder, RIGHT 
TO CREATE, Apr. 29, 2006, http://righttocreate.blogspot.com/2006/04/write-free-software-
pay-203000-to.html. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating 
Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004). 
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train, supra note 15, at 2027–28. 
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test combined preempting a range of types of infringement with pur-
suing individual infringements after they happened. It contemplated a 
broad range of sweeping preemptive design changes — analogous to 
requiring a VCR maker to remove the fast forward or record but-
tons175 — if a cost-benefit analysis, including evidence of current uses 
of the technology in question, pointed the way. Just as prior restraints 
on speech are disfavored, so too should we view skeptically prior re-
straints on technology that are intended to preempt infringements that 
have yet to occur, especially since the activities forestalled by changes 
to information technologies are themselves quite frequently speech-
related.176 
VI. GATEKEEPING ON THE GRID: GROKSTER AS FORBEARANCE 
Grokster was the natural next step beyond Napster and Aimster. 
Napster was ultimately shut down, and its name applied to a licensed 
pay service along the lines of Rhapsody or Apple’s iTunes.177 But by 
most credible accounts, unauthorized file sharing continued unabated, 
and indeed grew, on systems less vulnerable to shutdown than Napster 
on both a legal and a technological level.178 
On March 13, 2000, inspired in part by Napster’s legal troubles 
and the corresponding implications for file sharing, Justin Frankel and 
Tom Pepper of the small startup Nullsoft, Inc., which had recently 
been bought by America Online, released Gnutella to the public at 
large.179 Gnutella was Napster shorn of the Napster service. It was 
software that one could download to a PC, run, and then use to con-
                                                                                                                  
175. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
176. See Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open Source? 
Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473, 476 
(2003). (“For example, the Free Software Foundation (‘FSF’), whose founder and most 
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177. See Alex Goldfayn, New System to Offer Tunes by the Month; Subscriptions Will 
Give Users Access to a Million Songs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2005, at C1 (discussing Nap-
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178. See Bryan H. Choi, Note, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 
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rent that are supplanting traditional P2P networks); Saul Hansell & Jeff Leeds, A Supreme 
Court Showdown for File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at C1 (“While some surveys 
have suggested that file-sharing activity slowed in 2003, when the Recording Industry As-
sociation of America began to sue individual users for trading copyrighted songs, Mr. Gar-
land [chief executive of BigChampagne] said that the number of people logging on to file-
sharing networks had risen steadily [since then].”). 
179. See  Patti Hartigan, Cyberlinks: Napster is Stirring Piracy Controversy, BOSTON 
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nect over the Internet to other PCs running Gnutella. Once connected, 
one could search across multiple Gnutella users for files to trade — a 
sort of bucket-brigade exchange that, like Internet packet routing it-
self, required no central coordination. 
Citing legal concerns, America Online withdrew the program the 
next day, but within a week, Gnutella had been reverse-engineered 
and a number of copycat and derivative Gnutella emulations were 
available and running.180 Some primarily used the protocols that 
Frankel and Pepper had conceived for Gnutella, allowing users of dif-
ferent PC applications written by different people to join the same 
virtual network of “Gnutella” users.181 Others created similar distrib-
uted networks, but ones that were incompatible with Gnutella clients. 
In March 2001, a Dutch company called Kazaa BV created a compet-
ing technology called FastTrack, and then sought to license develop-
ers to write compatible PC software that would be able to connect to 
other computers also using FastTrack technology. Grokster was one 
of these applications, and its creators (along with Kazaa BV) were 
sued for copyright infringement by the music publishers that Octo-
ber.182 
Both Napster and Aimster had run services, and in doing so, 
could fairly be asked to take some steps to eliminate piracy as they 
were alerted to specific instances of it. But according to Napster, at 
least, if these companies were no longer running services, and only 
distributing products capable of substantial noninfringing uses, the 
analysis would be over and the defendants should prevail — even if 
the products used the Internet to create their own “service” among 
users.183 Demonstrating “actual” infringements to the defendants and 
demanding action would be like showing Sony instances of its VCR 
being misused in homes at a point when it was too late to realistically 
ask Sony to do anything about it, unless one were asking for the kind 
of preemption in product design that Sony eschewed. 
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True to Napster, the Grokster district court found in favor of the 
defendants, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.184 Grokster was a product, 
not a service, and Sony precluded banning it or insisting that it be de-
signed to preemptively eliminate piracy.185 While some of the defen-
dants had commercial websites to distribute and advertise their wares, 
as well as ongoing business models that inserted advertisements di-
rectly into the FastTrack-compatible software, the software was coded 
so as not to require assistance from a central server to function. Con-
structive knowledge at the design stage could not be imputed thanks 
to a Sony defense, and actual knowledge of specific infringements was 
only possible once the software had been released and the makers 
were no longer in a position to materially contribute to the infringe-
ment. 
Had Grokster appeared before the Seventh Circuit, its posture be-
fore the Supreme Court might have been significantly different. The 
Aimster balancing test likely would have made a finding in Grokster’s 
favor a much closer call. As the Ninth Circuit observed in a footnote, 
the Grokster defendants were much more effective than the Aimster 
defendants in showing noninfringing uses of the system.186 Grokster 
introduced evidence that its software had been enlisted to transmit 
public domain works, including texts, films, and copyrighted but au-
thorized works such as an album by the band Wilco.187 However, 
passing the “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” threshold 
would not have served as an absolute shield against infringement li-
ability under Aimster. Grokster’s noninfringing uses would have been 
balanced against the costs of designing and engineering the software 
in a different way to preemptively preclude some or all infringe-
ment.188 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari189 in Grokster, in part 
to resolve the circuit split between the Ninth Circuit and Seventh Cir-
cuit approaches,190 the stakes in Grokster were not limited to which 
circuit had properly interpreted Sony. Grokster was an opportunity for 
the Supreme Court to consider imposing an affirmative duty on soft-
ware makers like the Grokster defendants, and makers of generative 
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technologies in general, to serve as gatekeepers. An Aimster-like bal-
ancing test would force product makers and service providers to pre-
emptively design their offerings to prevent them from being used by 
bad apples. Fearing that they would fall on the wrong side of such a 
balancing test, technology providers likely would slow or stop creat-
ing generative — and liability-exposing — innovations. The Supreme 
Court wisely did not take such a landmark step. 
Although the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Grokster defen-
dants, it did so in a way that had little practical effect, and that took no 
significant step toward curtailing Internet generativity. To be sure, the 
Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied Sony’s “ca-
pable of commercially significant noninfringing uses” test.191 The 
Sony test was found to preclude imputing culpable intent solely based 
on the “characteristics or uses of a distributed product” or knowledge 
that the product may be used for infringing purposes.192 However, 
intent to infringe could be demonstrated through other extrinsic evi-
dence.193 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court 
adopted the common law doctrine of inducement as a “sensible one 
for copyright [law],” holding that “one who distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by 
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringe-
ment, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third par-
ties.”194 Neither knowledge of actual infringing uses  — let alone 
potential infringing uses  — nor ordinary business activity such as 
providing customer support or product updates would subject a dis-
tributor to liability in and of itself.195 “Purposeful, culpable expression 
and conduct” would be necessary to impose liability under the new 
inducement rule.196  
The Court’s inducement standard resembles the Food and Drug 
Administration’s policy of looking at how a product or service is mar-
keted and packaged to determine liability. Under FDA rules, a drug 
company could run into trouble for advertising a drug for a non-
approved use, even if it may sell the very same drug for other uses.197 
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Or, a non-drug company could run into trouble if it marketed chicken 
soup to cure colds, even if it turned out that chicken soup did so. If, 
after Sony, Sony, Inc., were to market a VCR called the “Pirate Box” 
and tout it using ads that showed people recording pay-per-view pro-
grams and selling them to others the next day, it may be found liable 
for contributory infringement without doing violence to the principles 
underlying the Sony standard, and we need not be troubled by that 
loss.198 Lurking in both Napster and Aimster was the fact that the ser-
vices in question were so clearly aimed at profiting from the swapping 
of copyrighted files. Noninfringing uses were truly incidental from the 
point of view of the service creators and maintainers, making these 
cases easier to decide. By confining a finding of liability in Grokster 
to its packaging and marketing as a pirate’s dream, the Supreme Court 
allowed those who marketed technologies in more generic ways to 
remain free of liability, as they should. This was similar to the appar-
ent mechanism of the INDUCE Act introduced in the 108th Congress 
that would have penalized those who “intentionally” aided infringe-
ment, with intent based upon “all relevant information about such acts 
then reasonably available to the actor, including whether the activity 
relies on infringement for its commercial viability.”199 
The Supreme Court viewed these successors to Napster as con-
tinuing a socially undesirable practice of facilitating flagrant in-
fringements in public view.200 The Court rightly found that there was 
evidence of the Grokster defendants’ intent to induce infringement 
that extended beyond the design of the product and the knowledge 
that it could be used for infringing purposes. The cited evidence in-
cluded the “internal communications and advertising designs” that 
were targeted at Napster users, the lack of any filtering tools or other 
preemptive features to curtail infringement, and the financial incen-
tives from selling ads as part of the software.201 Based on this evi-
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dence, the Court declared that the “unlawful objective is unmistak-
able.”202 
In the wake of Grokster, even software makers without good law-
yers will know not to tout the copyright-infringing uses of their ge-
neric tools. But the tools themselves seem to have remained largely, if 
not entirely, protected by Sony — so long as they are not wrapped in 
inducing rhetoric. To be sure, Grokster’s own website exhorted users 
not to infringe copyright, and was otherwise crafted to emphasize 
valuable uses: “Transform Grokster into a powerful, no cost distribu-
tion platform for authors and artists all over the world. Investigative 
journalists, dissenting activists, and uncompromising creators can take 
advantage of the fastest growing medium on the planet.”203 But these 
demonstrations indeed seemed pretextual when juxtaposed with other 
marketing efforts touting Grokster’s ability to direct users to the most 
popular files, which were often unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
music.204 Jane Ginsburg sees Grokster’s  inducement standard as 
slightly stronger, speculating that a device that “facilitates infringe-
ment on a massive scale” can be found inducing under Grokster for 
that alone,205 but the Grokster Court seemed not to go that far. It 
pointed to a failure to put mechanisms in place to filter out infringing 
content as “underscoring” Grokster’s intentional facilitation of copy-
right infringement, but then quickly added that such a failure could 
not be the sole basis for liability.206 
The practical consequences of the Supreme Court’s Grokster de-
cision in stemming actual infringement are thus negligible. Grokster 
as a commercial enterprise and some other similar services have 
closed their doors,207 but the demise of Grokster as a firm or as a web-
site has not affected the functionality of its software or the overlay 
network created by the software. File sharers can continue to use the 
Grokster software to find and trade music; they simply cannot send 
friends to Grokster.com to obtain additional copies of the client soft-
ware. Software with near-identical functionality is available else-
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where,208 and under Grokster, releasing such software will likely be 
found permissible so long as its marketing does not invite copyright 
infringement. The presence of software authors willing to code and 
release file-sharing software without any business model at all sug-
gests that this software will continue to exist even if it cannot be mar-
keted formally, much less marketed as a pirate’s tool. Software 
capable of piracy can simply be developed by anonymous amateurs 
and released onto the Net for general use. The true authors might 
never be found, and if found, would likely be judgment-proof; in any 
case, the fruits of their labor would still exist on the Net. While less-
than-perfect enforcement is no reason not to apply a wise law where 
otherwise possible, the ability of underground software to spread 
overnight undermines most valid applications of Grokster’s new in-
ducement rule. 
If Grokster’s inducement standard were applied too broadly, the 
resulting software production landscape would be one that metaphori-
cally lacks a middle class. Big software companies could negotiate 
deals with publishers, or could afford to defend their activities right to 
the line of legal permissibility; hit-and-run individual coders could 
write software that ignores the legal line with impunity, so long as 
they did not need to anchor the software to an ongoing service. Those 
in the middle — wanting to be law-abiding but lacking the resources 
to either preempt or contest legal liability — would be the ones frozen 
out. 
Consider LOCKSS, a peer-to-peer system designed for libraries 
to retain documents for thousands of years and to determine whether a 
digital copy of a document remains authoritative.209 The designers of 
LOCKSS (and their risk-averse academic sponsors) simply would not 
want to risk a finding that they were intentionally aiding infringers, 
especially if the publishers were allowed to present “reasonable alter-
native design” evidence, as in products liability cases,210 to show that 
the makers of LOCKSS could have included content or other policing 
filters and still accomplished most of what they intended. Although 
makers of physical products have their design decisions routinely sec-
ond-guessed through products liability cases, the underlying rationales 
for strict products liability are not persuasive here.211 Risk-spreading 
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can actually work in the opposite direction. Here, a single program-
mer could be asked to bear the risk of an entire industry’s piracy, 
rather than a powerful company assuming the risk of many small in-
dividual injuries corresponding to the number of product units sold. 
With copyright infringement, no imperative of physical injury calls 
for judicial intervention. 
The right application of Grokster will make only the slightest ad-
justment from Sony and continue to accord providers of software 
products with broad immunity from the misuse of their products, and 
providers of digital services with only modest gatekeeping liability in 
keeping with Kraakman’s framework.212  
With the advent of fully distributed peer-to-peer networks that 
will exist anyway in the post-Grokster climate, what will publishers 
do next? One wishes for the re-laying of flagstones suggested at the 
very beginning of this Article. Ideas like those of William Fisher213 
and Neil Netanel214 for alternative compensation schemes could ac-
complish this goal. Such schemes propose collecting blanket taxes on 
overall instrumentalities, like ISP services or computer purchases, and 
directing these funds to creators and publishers in proportion to the 
popularity of their intellectual fruits. Downloading and sharing would 
become a blessing rather than a curse, since it would demonstrate 
popularity and thus win more of the pie for a content creator. What-
ever the merits of such a system — and there is of course spirited de-
bate about it — it is not likely that the publishers or the regulators 
they lobby will soon embrace it. More likely, the publishers will con-
tinue to provide comparatively cheap, but still profitable, authorized 
media through such services as the iTunes music store or monthly 
subscription services, and many consumers will choose to pay a small 
fee per download or per month, or watch interspersed streaming ad-
                                                                                                                  
turer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of 
others, as the public cannot. . . . The cost of an injury and the loss of 
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person in-
jured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing 
business. . . . [I]t is to the public interest to place the responsibility for 
whatever injury [such defective products] may cause upon the manu-
facturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the 
product, is responsible for its reaching the market. 
Id. 
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vertisements, rather than undertake the effort to obtain the files for 
free through a pirate network — especially if there is some prospect 
of individual liability. 
In the medium term, we are likely to see four continuing strate-
gies by publishers. First, direct lawsuits against file swappers will 
place further pressure on individuals to cease mass infringing activi-
ties, since such activity is motivated only by weak altruism to faceless 
strangers, or by a failure to appreciate or change the default settings in 
peer-to-peer software. Second, contributory infringement claims will 
bring increased pressure on ISPs, the only remaining gatekeeper, to 
terminate their subscribers’ Internet access when the ISPs are notified 
of active file-sharing. Third, self-help efforts by publishers will con-
tinue to disrupt public file-sharing networks, such as flooding of net-
works with decoy files to frustrate searches for particular songs, and 
so-called interdiction, whereby publishers’ computers establish run-
away demand for users’ shared files so as to fill up the sharer’s queue 
and deny downloads to other users. Fourth, new business models will 
provide consumers convenient access to content they like and may not 
have known about otherwise, including the aggregation of content 
generated by the consumers themselves rather than by professional 
authors and creators. Juxtaposed with these strategies are two wild 
cards discussed in the next section: the rise of generic overlay net-
works, and the amenability of today’s PC/Internet grid to regulation of 
PC software after the software is in users’ hands. 
VII. THE END OF REGULATORY FORBEARANCE?: FROM 
KRAAKMAN’S GATEKEEPERS TO LESSIG’S GATEKEEPERS 
Ideally, Grokster might simply have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding below without adding an inducement counterpart to Sony. 
Such a decision would have categorically avoided the possibility of 
unduly chilling technology development through any future overbroad 
applications of the inducement standard, at the expense of allowing 
bad actors like Grokster Ltd. to continue in business, or of provoking 
Congress to actions that might depart even further from Sony’s bal-
ance. As it stands, Grokster still inherits Sony’s wisdom because its 
inducement theory seems limited enough to rarely offer a path to 
gatekeeper liability. Grokster is therefore well-decided precisely be-
cause it is not landmark. 
What, then, will be the next battleground if publishers are not able 
to find accommodation with the problem of piracy through alternative 
compensation schemes or more limited digital music store schemes 
like iTunes and Rhapsody? Two phenomena are pulling the tug-of-
war in opposite directions. Working against publishers is the rise of 
new “overlay networks.” Internet-aware PC applications are continu-No. 2]  A History of Online Gatekeeping  295 
 
ing to evolve, and their next step will extend the problems of Grokster 
itself, where a legal win for the industry did not provide any actual 
way to shut down the Grokster software already running on individual 
machines. Academic projects like LOCKSS215 and Publius,216 and 
more pedestrian counterparts such as FreeNet,217 BitTorrent,218 and 
eXeem,219 are helping to create a grid. Files can be stored in bits and 
pieces on PCs all across the Internet, typically without the PC owners 
themselves knowing what fragments they hold. The result is a collec-
tive hard drive for humanity, accessible by anyone but run by no one: 
one whose contents cannot be edited piece by piece and can only be 
degraded through the crude destruction of individual nodes that have 
volunteered to host such a configuration. A project by which users can 
lend their spare disk space and processing power to the rest of the 
world is the apotheosis of generativity and of disruption. It is the em-
bodiment of the “Libertarian gotcha” that James Boyle properly 
deemed illusory during the mid-1990s: the idea that if a sovereign 
allows Internet access within its borders, it cannot easily pick and 
choose which uses to allow and which to deny.220 
While the development of such grids points to a possible check-
mate against the publishers, Internet applications are not the only 
moving pieces to the puzzle of the Internet’s future. The PC, too, is 
evolving, as is the underlying network, in a way that tilts in favor of 
regulability. I have written elsewhere that fundamental, discontinuous 
changes are being wreaked upon the Internet of the 1990s by the mak-
ers of information technology: the PC and OS manufacturers, main-
stream software authors, and the public interest Internet engineering 
establishment.221 These changes stand to invert many of the possibili-
ties described here, allowing for far greater, rather than lesser, gate-
keeping control.  
So long as code has any generative quality — such as the stan-
dard PC operating system that allows third parties to write new soft-
ware to run on it, or a word processor that allows the composition of 
the Communist Manifesto as easily as the Declaration of Independ-
ence — anticipating ex ante, and building effective barriers against, 
its misuse will not be easy. Like a child leaving home, the code is first 
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nurtured by its author and then set free to find its life in a larger com-
munity. The notion of a distinct phase between the design of code and 
its broader use and misuse has helped us understand the regulatory 
forbearance in a decision like Sony, which permitted the manufacture 
of VCRs despite the fact that those recorders could be — and indeed, 
were, in many instances — used to infringe copyright. The identifica-
tion of substantial noninfringing uses for the recorders meant they 
were permissible to distribute, since a ban on distribution would pre-
clude lawful uses as well as unlawful ones. Similarly, in Grokster, the 
code was not to be judged standing alone, but rather by the actions of 
those who packaged and promoted it. This suggests most code cannot 
of itself easily be labeled contraband unless it flunks Sony’s generous 
test; only the activity surrounding its promotion can give rise to liabil-
ity. 
However, the rise of always-on, broadband-connected PCs means 
that software or operating systems need not follow a factory-produces, 
consumer-inherits sequence. Software can become service,222 tuned 
and re-tuned near-instantly by its author, like a child who leaves home 
but finds the parents not only constantly in touch, but able to set and 
adjust curfews from afar. Software can now be routinely written to 
maintain contact with its source: first, to receive updates to functional-
ity, but second, to implement new regulatory mandates. Security 
software vendors, and operating system makers now undertaking pro-
active security functions, are not only able to update their own soft-
ware, but also to affect how other software on the same PC runs — in 
particular, to disable it should it be deemed a threat.223 This function-
ality would enable regulators to insist to a software maker, or alterna-
tively to an operating system vendor, that a given piece of software be 
disabled or modified to meet regulatory requirements. These are Les-
sig’s gatekeepers, rather than Kraakman’s,224 and a landmark regula-
tory move will be one that decides under what circumstances they 
should be enlisted.  
How should we think about this possibility? Our look at previous 
regulatory forbearance on and off the Net offers reasons why ease of 
regulation should not necessarily prompt it. From the early, simpler 
configurations of defamation and copyright infringement, we saw 
courts and Congress ultimately unwilling to ask intermediaries to do 
more than opportunistic gatekeeping of wrongs in which they were 
directly involved, or to which they were close enough to efficiently 
judge and moderate. Demands for intervention did not extend to the 
creation of new technology architectures. Only when providers were 
already monitoring, or able to monitor, for their own purposes  did 
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regulators look to tack on additional obligations — as with Prodigy’s 
decision to screen its message boards, or Napster’s decision to offer a 
centralized directory of file names it could screen and subscribers 
whose access it could terminate. Similarly, software authors who de-
cide not to implement automatic update functionality in their code 
should not be required to do so for the sake of future regulability.225 
The same forbearance should also apply to antivirus and operat-
ing system makers who decide to implement functionality allowing 
updates to their own code and modification of others’ code. Suppose a 
publisher fully litigated the ongoing misuses of a particular piece of 
software and suggested an alternative way to write it that would pre-
clude its bad uses. Instead of going after the code’s author — thereby 
respecting the author’s choice not to embed a way to implement future 
changes to her code  — the publisher could instead seek an order 
against operating system makers and security vendors to disable the 
bad code on PCs that receive updates from them. This might appear to 
be precisely the kind of regulatory piggybacking that the history of 
online gatekeeping has permitted — and Grokster is silent on the is-
sue. 
Such gatekeeping should be disfavored. Piggybacking on auto-
matic update functionality might cause consumers to gravitate away 
from software carrying such functionality once they saw their PCs’ 
behavior modified by government fiat in undesirable or unexpected 
ways. More fundamentally, such gatekeeping is too powerful, permit-
ting short-term regulatory panic to be translated too readily into long-
term limitations. Lessig has pointed out that open code — code that 
programmers can alter and redistribute without undue legal or techni-
cal barriers — is harder to regulate than closed code.226 He lauds that 
quality as a way of enabling a fundamental check on government’s 
power, and obliquely suggests that check as a good one: “Just as our 
Constitution embeds the values of the Bill of Rights while also em-
bedding the protections of separation of powers, so too should we 
think about the values that cyberspace embeds, as well as its struc-
ture.”227 Here the fulcrum of control is not open versus closed code. 
Indeed, open code may actually be more readily modifiable for con-
trol purposes than closed code, since its recipe is available to a regula-
tor, necessitating comparatively less cooperation from its authors to 
change the way it works. Further, security software that has been 
given orders to eliminate contraband code running on its PC can carry 
out its task on both open and closed code. However, Lessig’s core 
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suggestion retains its power: we might prefer a world in which regula-
tion of code is not easy. Ease of implementing a particular regulation 
is one reason to favor such regulation, but it should not be the overrid-
ing one. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Grokster case fits well within a ten-year pattern of forbear-
ance in American legislative and judicial activity that has been appro-
priately willing to abstain from major intervention in the private 
development of information technology. This forbearance may soon 
be put to its most difficult test, as the mechanisms for invasion of le-
gally protected interests defy minor corrective interventions at tradi-
tional online points of control,228 even as they become unusually 
amenable to a major new one through remote tuning of already-
distributed PC software. 
The prospect of software as service permits a major regulatory in-
trusion to be implemented as a technically minor adjustment to code. 
The history of online gatekeeping is partly one of the exercise of raw 
political power by intermediaries to limit their responsibilities. But it 
is also one of policy judgment in the judicial as well as legislative 
spheres that generative technologies ought to be given wide latitude to 
find a variety of uses — including ones that encroach upon other in-
terests. These encroachments may be undesirable individually, but 
particularly in the realm of malum prohibitum wrongs such as those 
associated with the American intellectual property system — a system 
primarily conceived to maximize creative output rather than to vindi-
cate moral rights of authors and publishers
229 — they may also point 
to opportunities to reconceptualize the rights underlying the markets 
and the business models based upon them. An information technology 
environment capable of recursive innovation in the realms of busi-
ness, art, and culture will best thrive with continued regulatory for-
bearance, carrying forward CompuServe,  Sony, and Grokster’s 
insight, applied across very different respective facts, that the disrup-
tion occasioned by generative information technology often amounts 
to a long-term gain even if it causes short-term threat to some power-
ful and legitimate interests. 
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